A Weekly Dose of Khalid Mohamed

 

In my early days in Delhi, living in a one-room set in Laxmi Nagar, Jamna Paar—a location that elicited sympathetic smiles from polite company—weekends meant “hope.” Newspapers published my art reviews, sometimes more than one in a single week. Seeing my name in print mattered enormously. Each article also meant a cheque, which helped us scrape through.

But it was not just my own articles that I looked forward to. I eagerly waited for the column by Khalid Mohamed, the controversial film critic, author, director and screenwriter. In those days, he had a column in the Hindustan Times. He had earlier quit the Times of India, a move I knew little about at the time. Yet I could immediately resonate with his writing: irreverent, full of humour, and rich in historical depth—qualities that the mainstream often seemed to detest.

Then, one day, he left the Hindustan Times too. It was a shock to his readers, myself included. I took his departure rather personally. In those days, I was not watching many mainstream Hindi films anyway. There were enough films to see at Siri Fort Auditorium, Shakuntalam (now defunct), Max Mueller Bhavan, the Russian Culture Centre, the Iranian Culture Centre, the French Cultural Centre, Alliance Française and elsewhere.

I got my flavour of mainstream Bollywood through Khalid Mohamed’s reviews. They were my weekly dose of an adrenaline rush from the other side of cinema, without my ever having to see those films on the big screen. In 1997, I bought a desktop computer, complete with floppy-disk and CD drives. I remember watching Bade Miyan Chote Miyan for the first time, and many more films thereafter.

When I read Not Quite Family, Khalid Mohamed’s beautifully penned memoir, those memories came rushing back. What is a person, if not an ensemble of memories?

Khalid Mohamed’s life has never been separate from Hindi cinema. His early education in cinema came through the classical era of black-and-white films, watched with his grandmother, who brought him up with adab and a deep sense of etiquette.

In this intimate memoir of Bollywood, Khalid Mohamed recounts episodes and anecdotes from the lives of its male and female stars. Yet, even when these are ostensibly stories about celebrities, what emerges most clearly is a poignant portrait of the author’s own intellectual and emotional life. He may reveal the clay feet of many matinee idols, but what makes these revelations compelling is the perspective he brings to them. In the end, that perspective becomes more illuminating than the stars themselves.

Quite candidly, Khalid Mohamed observes that the new crop of actors working on OTT platforms, across numerous web series, are often more straightforward, intelligent, inclusive and talented, even though they do not receive the attention they deserve. We also get a glimpse of how the author navigated the rough waters of mutual-admiration clubs and nepotism while writing screenplays for films such as Mammo, Sardari Begum and Zubeida, directed by Shyam Benegal, and directing films such as Fiza, Tehzeeb and Silsilay.

Not Quite Family is not merely a memoir of Bollywood. It is also a memoir of a life lived alongside cinema—of watching, writing, remembering, observing and, ultimately, making sense of an entire cultural world.

A highly recommended memoir.

JohnyML

Dimagee Naxals and the Orwellian Thought Police

 (George Orwell)

“The other is hell,” said Albert Camus. It was quite an existential statement. But in the hands of Edward Said, the “Other” became the one who is forced into hell. For the survival of any ideology, there has to be an “Other”—someone against whom we define ourselves. It makes us believe that our survival depends on comparison. We other, therefore we are.

Yesterday, when the Prime Minister spoke to the nation on the occasion of the 80th Independence anniversary from the ramparts of the historic Red Fort, he once again created another “Other”: the Dimagee Naxal, or the “mentally Naxal.”

The Prime Minister, however, did not pinpoint who these Dimagee Naxals are. Nor, unlike an earlier infamous political remark, did he suggest that they could be identified by their clothes.

Dimagee Naxal is the latest contestable term to enter our political vocabulary. The Prime Minister could have meant several things by it. Perhaps he meant “Urban Naxals”—the so-called Naxals who live in cities. But these are not the gun-wielding, emaciated young men and women in the forests of Bastar or Dandakaranya who have taken Maoism as their political faith and way of life.

Urban Naxals, in the contemporary political imagination, are more likely to be intellectuals, academics, students, writers and citizens who think differently from the dominant ideology—in our case, the dominant right-wing Hindutva ideology. They have previously been described as “anti-nationals,” members of “tukde-tukde gangs,” and by many other labels.

In the immediate political context, however, Dimagee Naxal could mean something else altogether. It could refer to the educated, jobless and frustrated youth of India—the very people who can be easily identified because they think, speak sense and assert their logic.

They want democracy. They want fraternity. Their primary demand is remarkably ordinary: decent jobs that allow them to fulfil their dreams and take care of their families. The government has offered plenty of promises, but very little that addresses this immediate anxiety. And, interestingly, this particular goalpost cannot simply be pushed twenty years into the future, to 2047.

Ever since the BJP-led NDA government came to power at the Centre in 2014, its political rhetoric has relied heavily on hyper-nationalism. To maintain that rhetoric at the same intensity, it has required a constant production of “Others.”

First, it was Pakistan. Then Indian Muslims—an established “Other” in Indian majoritarian politics since the late nineteenth century. Then China and Chinese products. Then students raising slogans of “Azadi.” Then beef eaters. Then those who did not consider the cow their mother. Later came Maoists and “Urban Naxals.” Then anyone who appeared too sensible, too educated or too questioning.

The list went on.

But now the process of “othering” appears exhausted. There are only so many Others one can manufacture.

Pakistan does not seem interested in constantly providing the enemy image that Indian political rhetoric requires. China plays its own strategic game, intelligently combining military pressure, trade and diplomacy. Indian Muslims have been forced to negotiate with a political reality that has repeatedly diminished their sense of security and belonging. Intellectuals and professors have been intimidated. Beef politics has transformed what people eat into a political question. Urban Naxals continue to write autobiographies, essays and books to record their experiences.

So the ruling party needs a new category.

And like Hollywood, which periodically needs to invent an alien threat when terrestrial enemies become insufficient, our political imagination seems to have arrived at something even more abstract:

The Dimagee Naxal.

The term needs some qualification. “Dimagee” suggests someone with a brain—someone who thinks, questions and acts. “Naxal” suggests the perpetual disruptor, the person who asks uncomfortable questions about justice, equality and rights.

But how does one identify a Dimagee?

A man with a beard, or a woman with kohl-lined eyes and unconventional clothes, might be taken for an intellectual. But appearance does not make an intellectual. A thinking person could look completely ordinary, without sending out any visible signal that says: I am brainy.

And therein lies the problem.

If the “Dimagee Naxal” is defined by thought rather than appearance, then virtually anyone can become one.

Our governments have historically been uncomfortable with education and independent thinking because education teaches people to ask questions. And where there are questions, there is the possibility of dissent, resistance and, eventually, political change.

The old feudal order, codified through texts such as the Manusmriti, placed severe restrictions on who could access knowledge. In contemporary India, one can see echoes of this anxiety in the systematic politicisation, weakening and restructuring of schooling and higher education.

The Dimagee Naxal also resonates disturbingly with George Orwell’s idea of the Thought Police.

In 1984, Orwell imagined a totalitarian state in which the government does not merely police actions or words—it polices thought itself. Surveillance becomes permanent. Movements are monitored. Words are scrutinised. Rooms are bugged. Telephones are tapped. People are watched. And eventually, even an unexpressed thought can become evidence of a crime.

We seem to have arrived, rather smoothly, at the threshold of that Orwellian condition.

Perhaps the Dimagee Naxal is the final stage in the politics of “othering”: when there are no more convincing external enemies left, the enemy becomes thought itself.

Anybody can now potentially be accused of a thought crime.

Be ready for it.

What is the next stop? I do not know.

But history tells us that regimes built entirely on the production of enemies eventually begin to consume themselves. The politics of permanent othering ultimately turns inward; the regime starts devouring the very society it claims to protect.

So, beyond all the expected calamities, perhaps there is a small silver lining around the clouds.

The final Other may eventually become the regime itself.

JohnyML

The Symbolism of Backpacks in E. P. Unny and Ai Weiwei

 (Cartoon by E P Unny)

Social revolutions often throw up symbols that remain fresh in the socio-cultural and political imagination, even though they may not play a direct role in revolutionary acts. In 1930, Mahatma Gandhi picked up a mundane object like salt and transformed it into a powerful political symbol through an unprecedented combination of creative imagination and practical philosophy. He made salt from seawater, openly defying the draconian British laws governing its production and sale.

In 2013, the Aam Aadmi Party picked up the broom as its election symbol, promising to clean society of bribery and other forms of corruption. Later, when the Chief Justice of India condescendingly described Indian youth as “cockroaches,” an Indian student, Abhijit Deepke, then studying at Boston University, created a satirical Instagram platform. The image of a creature that had hitherto been considered despicable was transformed into a lasting symbol of organisation, protest and agitation.

While the cockroach grew in stature through its many avatars, shaped by the imagination of millions of young Indian content creators, another mundane object emerged as a powerful symbol of the educated, rejected, frustrated, dispossessed, betrayed and job-seeking youth of India: the backpack.

Alongside the dominant cockroach symbol, the backpack became an enduring marker of the Gen-Z generation that spearheaded the agitation on the ground and brought about a series of changes in the government's attitude. A minister resigned, the Prime Minister began making reels, and parliamentarians started adopting Gen-Z expressions and language. Meanwhile, the cascading effect of the protests began to spread across the country.

(Remembering by Ai Weiwei)

Irrespective of gender or class—and regardless of the brand or price of the bag—most young people use backpacks for their convenience. They can carry their dreams as well as their worldly possessions in them. Unlike many other kinds of bags, backpacks leave the carrier's hands free, allowing greater freedom of movement. The shoulders and back together can support the weight while travelling, and most backpacks are relatively inexpensive and affordable.

For a young person, a backpack can contain a miniature version of their room, their work, their aspirations and, in a sense, their life.

When thousands of young people arrived at Jantar Mantar in July this year, demanding the resignation of the Union Education Minister, none of them knew how long the struggle would last. They came prepared with backpacks containing spare clothes, snacks, laptops, mobile chargers, books, water bottles, sanitary napkins and, above all, hope and determination.

The protest continued for a month, accompanied by the state's increasingly ruthless resistance, which went to the extent of using brutal pellet guns against unarmed students demanding their rights.

Backpacks were everywhere.

Today, I came across a cartoon by the veteran intellectual cartoonist E. P. Unny of The Indian Express. It contained nothing but the image of a backpack, complete with a water bottle tucked into the side net and a book and pen in the outer pocket. The caption simply read: “15 Aug 2026.”

What a befitting cartoon for the 80th anniversary of Indian Independence.

This minimalist cartoon transforms the Gen-Z symbol of an ordinary backpack into a lasting icon of an ongoing socio-cultural resistance. From Delhi, the Gen-Z protests have spread to different parts of India, and now even Gen-Alpha has begun raising its voice for better educational facilities and teaching. They are supported by Gen-Z leaders who have chosen to function as a pressure group rather than convert the momentum of the movement into a political party.

Unny is not alone in transforming the backpack into a cultural and political symbol.

In a very different context, the prominent Chinese conceptual artist Ai Weiwei created an installation using thousands of backpacks. Titled Remembering, the installation was a response to the devastating 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, China, in which more than 80,000 people lost their lives, many of them schoolchildren.

Weiwei investigated why the death toll among schoolchildren was so high. He discovered that many school buildings had collapsed because they had been constructed with cheap materials, amid rampant institutional corruption and the alleged siphoning of funds by politically influential building contractors.

For Remembering, Weiwei used 9,000 school backpacks. Arranged on the façade of the Haus der Kunst in Munich, the backpacks formed the sentence “She lived happily for seven years in this world” in Mandarin. The words were made up of backpacks, each associated with a child whose name his team of researchers had identified through grieving parents and government records.

The backpacks in Weiwei's installation carry the weight of children who are no longer there. Unny's backpack, on the other hand, carries the presence of a generation that refuses to disappear into silence.

E. P. Unny's untitled cartoon and Ai Weiwei's Remembering thus symbolise two different tragedies of our times. One speaks of a generation fighting to protect its future; the other remembers children whose future was brutally taken away.

Yet both works ultimately speak to the same human imperative: the fight against forgetting.

A backpack can carry books, clothes, food, technology and the small necessities of everyday life. But in the hands of an artist—or in the hands of a generation in revolt—it can carry something much larger: memory, resistance, grief, aspiration and hope.

JohnyML